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Modelling the world economy at the 2050 horizon 
Jean Fouré1, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré2, Lionel Fontagné3 
Forthcoming, Economics of Transition 
ABSTRACT  
Economic analysis increasingly addresses long term issues (such as global warming), which requires a 
dynamic baseline of the world economy. To this aim we develop a 3-factor (capital, energy, labour) 
macroeconometric model (MaGE - Macroeconometrics of the Global Economy) and project growth 
for 147 countries to 2050. We improve on the literature by (i) accounting for the energy constraint 
through dynamic modelling of energy productivity, (ii) modelling female participation rates 
consistently with educational catch-up, (iii) departing from the assumptions of either a closed 
economy or full capital mobility (by applying a Feldstein-Horioka-type relationship between savings 
and investment rates), and (iv) offering a fully-consistent treatment of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
These innovative features have sizeable impact on projected GDPs. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Economic analysis increasingly addresses long-term issues, such as natural resource depletion, global 
warming, or energy scarcity. To do so, relying on a baseline of the world economy is generally a 
prerequisite, hence the need to project production factors and economic growth based on a sound and 
transparent theoretical and econometric framework. Surprisingly, with some exceptions (Duval and de 
la Maisonneuve, 2010, Johansson et al., 2013), the economic literature does not care much about these 
issues. This contrasts with the large interest for long term projections in the business community and 
in international organizations.
4
 The reasons for academic prudence vis-à-vis long-term projections are 
understandable. First, long-term projections rarely prove accurate and are likely to be heavily 
disrupted by geopolitical events that can hardly be expected. Second, a consistent projection of the 
world economy imposes applying the same methodology to each country, which is unlikely to fit the 
reality. Still, the scarcity of solidly-grounded, long-term projection exercises may oblige downstream 
analysts to rely on some form of extrapolation, which is likely to generate misleading orders of 
magnitude.  
Our argument then is that a sound and transparent macroeconometric framework, combined with 
publicly available data, code and projections, will provide a useful basis both for the necessary debate 
on the evolution of the global economy in the long run, and for downstream analyses. This paper aims 
at providing such framework through the MaGE (Macroeconometrics of the Global Economy) model. 
Four major improvements on the literature are introduced: (i) we explicitly tackle energy use and 
efficiency, through relying on a nested CES structure à la van der Werf (2008) and Markandya and 
                                                 
4
 This interest is visible in the success encountered by partially documented projections (e.g. Wilson and 
Purushothaman (2003), “Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050”, and Wilson et al. (2011), “The BRICs 10 Years 
On: Halfway Through The Great Transformation” in Goldman Sachs Global Economics Papers; Ward (2011), “The 
World in 2050: Quantifying the Shift in Global Economy”, HSBC Global Economics, January; Hawksworth and 
Anmol (2011), “The World in 2050–The Accelerating Shift of Global Economic Power: Challenges and 
Opportunities”. Price Waterhouse Coopers, January.). An effort to rely on firm theoretical foundations is provided by 
Poncet (2006), 'The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World Economy: Horizon 2050', CEPII Working Paper 16, 
and by the continuous efforts of the OECD (see, e.g., Chapter of the OECD Economic Outlook, 2012/1). 
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Pedrosso-Galinato (2007), and modelling a U-shape relationship between economic development an 
energy productivity; (ii) we model female participation to the labour market and education in a 
consistent way; (iii) we relax the closed economy assumption hardly adapted to a globalised economy 
when capital accumulation is at stake; (iv) we finally model valuation effects instead of sticking to 
volumes, using a Balassa-Samuelson effect derived from the specific production function. 
After setting the theoretical framework, we propose careful panel econometric estimations over 1980-
2009 for 147 countries. We then perform recursive projections at the 2050 horizon, starting in 2013 
when we assume that output gaps related to the 2008-09 global crisis have been closed. Finally, we 
quantify the impact of our four innovative features, as well as some modeling assumptions, on 
projected GDPs. 
In the central scenario, China and India grow 9-fold between 2010 and 2050 at constant relative prices. 
Over the same period, the US and EU economies would inflate by around 90%. Adjusting for relative 
price variations results in a 20-fold increase in China’s GDP and a 17-fold increase for India.5 
Assumptions on energy, female participation and international capital mobility are shown to have a 
very significant impact for some countries or areas, with sometimes two-digit variations in GDP. 
Conversely, the impact is relatively limited at the global level (never above 2.5 percent of global GDP 
at the 2050 horizon). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The theoretical framework is set up in Section 1. 
Section 2 describes the data and econometric estimations of behavioural relations. Section 3 reports 
projections up to 2050. Section 4 shows how our methodological innovations impact long-run 
projections. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
5
 The detailed projections are available at www.cepii.fr.  
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1. INNOVATIVE FEATURES OF OUR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Conditional on institutions, long-term growth is determined by labour force, capital accumulation and 
TFP growth. Energy is not usually considered a separate factor for GDP projections. Hence, its 
contribution to growth is most often embodied in TFP growth. This is not satisfactory for two reasons. 
First, for most economies, energy scarcity and subsequent price increase will likely constitute a major 
constraint to GDP growth in the future – a constraint that can be partially circumvented by progress in 
energy efficiency; second, for oil producers, GDP growth is less dependent on labour force increase, 
capital accumulation, and TFP growth than on oil-price variations. In this section, we first present how 
energy is incorporated in the model. We then describe our theoretical improvements on the literature 
concerning the labour force, capital accumulation and valuation effects. The empirical strategy is 
detailed in the next section. 
1.1. Energy 
We rely on a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function where capital can 
be substituted for labour with a unitary elasticity (Cobb-Douglas assumption) whereas the capital-
labour bundle can substitute less easily for the scarcity of energy. The use of such nested CES 
production function was proposed by David and van de Klundert (1965) to encompass different kinds 
of input-augmenting technical change, and was employed also in van der Werf (2008),  Markandya 
and Pedrosso-Galinato (2007) as well as in Chateau et al. (2012). Consistently, real GDP for country i 
at time t can be written as: 
                                                  ,       ,         (1.1) 
where      denotes the volume of GDP, and      ,      and      represent energy, capital and labour, 
respectively.  In oil-producing countries,      is taken net of the oil rent in order to avoid a biased 
measure of productivity.      is the usual TFP term, which in this case is the efficiency of the 
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combination of labour and capital, and      is a measure of energy productivity. For exposition 
purpose, we will drop country and time subscripts for the remainder of this section.
6
 
Oil production is assumed to be a pure rent: the volume of production is constant, but its real value (in 
terms of the GDP deflator) increases depending on the relative price of oil. The oil rent is ultimately 
added to the non-oil GDP.7 
At each period, the optimal level of energy consumption E depends both on energy productivity B and 
on the relative price of energy pE. Maximizing the representative firm’s profit given the production 
function (1.1) yields:              (1.2) 
Energy productivity B is distinct from TFP A which is calculated as a Solow-like residual. Over the 
past, B is recovered by inverting Equation (1.2). Looking forward, it is projected as a U-shaped 
function of economic development (see Section 2.1). 
The elasticity of substitution between energy and the capital-labor bundle,  , is calibrated 
based on the range of existing estimates.8 Specifically, we choose      , which allows us to 
recover plausible values of B over the 1980-2008 period.9 
                                                 
6
 Estimating the parameters of Equation (1.1) is beyond the scope of this paper. As detailed by Griliches and Mairesse 
(1995), such an estimation raises a number of econometric difficulties. Here we select =0.3 which is a standard value 
of the literature. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) find this value when controlling the estimation for human capital. 
Since we also control for human capital, although in a different way, we believe =0.3 to be a relatively safe 
assumption. The calibration of   is discussed below. 
7
 Due to the lack of data, energy rents are here limited to oil rents. This simplification is benign since oil dominates 
international exchanges of non-renewable energies. In the following, we indifferently use the terms “energy” and “oil”.  
8
 See Van der Werf (2008), who finds estimates ranging from 0.17 to 0.69 for 12 OECD countries over 1978-1996. 
9
 Past values of B are an inverse function of energy price, and the more so the higher the chosen elasticity. For      , the past evolution of energy productivity B mirrors that of the energy price, with marked short-term volatility. To 
measure the sensitivity of our results to the value of this elasticity, we have performed the whole projection exercise 
for values of   ranging from 0.15 to 0.40. Although the value of the elasticity makes a difference for fast-growing 
countries, the ranking of the major countries stays unaffected at the 2050 horizon. Results are available upon request. 
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1.2. Female participation 
We rely on United Nations projections of the working-age population (medium fertility projection), on 
which we apply an original modeling of participation rates. Existing projections of participation rates 
by ILO have two limitations. First, they do not extend beyond 2020. Second, they rely on a 
conservative modeling of female participation rates, which is questionable, given the ongoing 
education convergence across the world. Surprisingly, educational catch up is sometimes considered 
as a factor fueling TFP growth, but its impact on female participation to the labor market is 
disregarded. We believe that failing to account for the impact of education on female participation can 
lead to biased projections of TFP, in particular for many catching-up countries. The modeling of 
participation rates simply relies on education catch up by cohort, which is also used to project TFP 
growth (see Section 2 for details). 
1.3. Capital mobility 
Capital accumulates through a standard, permanent-inventory process depending on gross capital 
formation and (constant) capital depreciation. The existing literature projects the latter either through a 
closed-economy assumption (hence investment is equal to savings on a country-by-country basis, see 
Poncet, 2006) or by assuming a convergence and/or stabilization process of the capital-to-GDP ratio 
(Duval and de la Maisonneuve, 2010; OECD, 2012). In contrast, we argue that large, lasting current-
account imbalances as was observed in the 2000s can no longer be neglected when capital 
accumulation is at stake, although savings and investments are closely related, as initially noted by 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980). Consistently, we rely on an estimated, error-correction relationship 
between saving and investment rates. Gross saving rates are derived from an econometric equation 
based on the life-cycle hypothesis.10 
                                                 
10
 We do not account here for any trend variation of the price of investment relative to the GDP deflator. The reason is 
the fragility of existing databases on this issue. 
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1.4. Valuation effects 
GDP projections in volume are useful to address reshaping of global production, demand for 
production factors and carbon emissions. However, they do not provide an indication of the weight of 
each country in terms of global purchasing or financial power. Hence we also need to project relative 
prices – a difficult task given the inconclusiveness of the literature on real exchange-rate 
determination, especially when a large number of currencies from both advanced and developed 
economies is at stake. Here we rely on the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which has been shown a 
relatively robust relationship in the literature.
11
 According to this theory, in each country the price of 
non-tradable goods tends to increase relative to that of tradable ones along economic catch-up, 
triggering real exchange-rate appreciation. Here we need to adapt the standard Balassa-Samuelson 
setup
12
 to our three-factor production function. 
We assume that every national economy has two sectors: traded goods (denoted by T), and non-traded 
goods (denoted by N). Both sectors have the same production functions as in Equation (1.1). However, 
their productivities differ in terms of both primary factors and energy. For each sector S (S=T,N), we 
have: 
                                  (1.3) 
where    denotes the Cobb-Douglas combination of capital and labour (            . Let   
denote the relative price of non-tradables to tradables:        . Writing the first-order conditions 
and assuming that the share of energy in income (denoted by  ) is the same in the two sectors, we 
get:
13
                               (1.4) 
                                                 
11
 Rogoff (1996) shows the Balassa-Samuelson to be relatively robust when contrasting advanced and developing 
countries. 
12
 See, e.g., De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994). 
13
 The proof is available from the authors. 
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where          . Assuming a Cobb-Douglas consumption bundle (             0<  <1), the real 
consumer price index, in terms of the tradable good can be written as:        . Ignoring 
productivity growth in the non-traded sector, and assuming that the share of traded goods in output is     (such that         ), we get:                                  (1.5) 
Finally, denoting by RER the real exchange rate (i.e. the relative price of the home consumption basket 
to the foreign one) and by a star the foreign country, we get:                                                    (1.6) 
Hence, real-exchange rate appreciation is based on aggregate TFP and energy productivity catch-up, 
and the effect is magnified by a higher share of non-tradable goods both in the consumption basket 
and in output, which themselves can move along economic development. 
2. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATIONS 
In order to recover the variables mentioned in Section 1, we need to carefully estimate a number of 
econometric relationships. In this section we focus on the distinctive features of the MaGE model, 
namely energy, female participation, capital accumulation and valuation effects. Data sources are 
listed in Appendix A and additional estimations (in particular education catch up and TFP growth) are 
presented in Appendix B. 
2.1. Energy 
As already mentioned, energy consumption is modelled based on the optimal behaviour of the 
representative firm given energy price and energy productivity (see Equation (1.2)). 
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We use the oil price as a proxy for the price of energy. It is forecasted to 2035 by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA).14 For 2035 to 2050, the price of energy is set to increase at a 
constant rate equal to its average growth rate over the 2030-2035 period. 
We model the growth rate of energy productivity as a two-dimensional catch-up process that results in 
a U-shaped relationship between economic development and energy productivity, relying on two 
different convergence processes: one to the development frontier, and the other one to the energy-
productivity frontier.
15
 Consistently, we estimate the following relationship on five-year intervals:                                                                 (2.1) 
where B*t-1 denotes the energy-productivity frontier.
16
 Over 1980-2009, time-series for energy 
productivity are recovered based on Equation (1.2), given observed GDP, energy consumption and the 
real oil price. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 1. For both OECD and non-OECD countries, the 
distance to the most efficient countries has the expected, negative impact on energy productivity 
growth: the further from the frontier (the lower B/B*) the higher energy productivity growth. For non-
OECD countries, this effect is compounded by a positive, significant impact of the distance to US 
GDP per capita on energy productivity growth: the closer to US GDP per capita (the higher y/yUS), the 
higher energy productivity growth. Hence, data support the idea of a double-catch-up process. In the 
following, we retain the OECD/non-OECD grouping for energy productivity. 
                                                 
14
 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/liquid_fuels.cfm, medium scenario. 
15
 Low income countries are energy-efficient because their economies are based on the primary sector. As countries 
develop, the weight of industry, which consumes more energy, increases, reducing aggregate productivity; after 
industrial transition is completed, technological efficiency tends to improve. 
16
 We define the energy-productivity frontier based on the mean of the four most energy productive countries (the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), leaving Switzerland aside due to its specificities (small landlocked 
country based mainly on services). 
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Table 1 - Energy productivity growth: estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OECD OECD Non-OECD 
Lagged distance to efficiency 
leader 
-0.058*** -0.059*** -0.090*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) 
    
Lagged distance to US GDP per 
capita 
-0.005  0.013* 
(0.019)  (0.007) 
    
Constant -0.019** -0.017*** -0.113*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.020) 
N 163 163 777 
Groups 25 25 137 
F-stat 1.949 2.479 2.715 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Five years intervals 
Source: own calculations.  
2.2 Female participation  
Female participation rates by age group are projected from 2010 to 2050 based on an econometric 
relation with education. This choice allows us to account for the anticipated rise in female 
participation rates for a number of developing countries, in line with projected catch-up in terms of 
education.
17
 
The literature on female participation points fertility, urbanization and education as key factors of 
female participation (see, e.g., Bloom et al. (2009)). However, the estimation of participation rates 
encounters a reverse-causality problem. In particular, fertility rates depend on activity. Bloom et al. 
circumvent this problem by instrumenting fertility with abortion laws. However abortion laws do not 
change frequently, so they can be embodied in country fixed effects. Here, we estimate the following 
logistic equation on our 5-year-interval education data:
18
 
                                                 
17
For men, we use ILO participation rates up to 2020. From 2021 to 2050, male participation rates are projected based 
on ILO’s methodology. Specifically, the participation rate of males of age a in country i at time t is         such as:                                        , where       and       are age and country-specific minimum and maximum participation rates, 
and a,i and ,i are the parameters of the process, which are recovered through a reverse engineering method. 
18
 In a preliminary step, we have checked that education accounts for a larger share of the variance, especially the time 
variance, of female labour participation rates, as compared to other factors investigated by Bloom et al. (2009): fertility 
rates, infant mortality and capital per capita. The results are available from the authors. 
11 
 
                                                        (2.2) 
where,         represents the participation rate of females of age a in country i at time t,         is the 
proportion of age-group a (of both genders)19 in year t that has at least a secondary diploma,         is 
the proportion holding a tertiary diploma,       is a country-age group fixed effect and        is the 
residual of the equation. 
Equation (2.2) is estimated for each age group separately, for 140 countries over 1980-2010.20 
Education is captured through school attainment by age group, based on the Barro and Lee (2010) 
database. The results are reported in Appendix B. We find a positive and significant impact of both 
levels of education on participation between 20 and 59 years old. Conversely, we find a negative 
impact before 20 (secondary and tertiary education), between 20 and 24 (tertiary education) and after 
60 (secondary education). The negative impact of education on participation of the 15-19 and 20-24 
groups can easily be explained by the lengthening of studies. As for the negative impact of education 
on participation of elder groups, it may be related to the ability of educated workers to retire, in 
contrast with non-educated ones, especially in developing countries. It can be inferred from the 
econometric results that, for a 5-year age group between 20 and 59 starting from a 30% female 
participation rate, a move from 60 to 100 percent secondary school attainment would raise the female 
participation rate by 4 to 12 percentage points, depending on the age group. 
The way education attainment by age group is projected is also detailed in Appendix B. Education 
attainment is modeled separately for primary, secondary and tertiary education. In each case, we 
                                                 
19
 Bloom et al. (2009) show the female participation rate to depend on both genders’ education attainment. 
20
 For the remaining seven countries, we have to rely on the respective regional means, due to missing data. 
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assume a simple catch-up process relative to the leader’s level,21 with different speeds across regions 
of the world. As for the leader, its education level is modeled through an estimated logistic function. 
Secondary and tertiary education also play a key role for TFP growth. Following Vandenbussche et al. 
(2006), we model TFP growth as the combination between a pure catch-up effect, a pure education 
effect, and an interaction term between education and catch up using instrumental variables to deal 
with endogeneity (see Appendix B). 
2.3 Capital mobility 
As already mentioned, capital accumulation is modelled based on an assumption of imperfect capital 
mobility. We first model the savings rate relying on Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei’s (1998) life-cycle 
approach (see Appendix B). We then estimate an error-correction model for the relationship between 
the savings rate and the investment rate, à la Feldstein-Horioka.
22
 
We start with the standard, Feldstein-Horioka type estimation (see Herwartz and Xu, 2010):                           (2.3) 
where       denotes the (yearly) investment-to-GDP ratio.23 The lower  , the higher capital mobility. 
We follow Chakrabarti (2006) and divide our sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, which can 
be justified by large differences in financial openness between the two types of countries. Preliminary 
panel unit root tests suggest that both saving and investment rates are non-stationary. We therefore 
perform panel-cointegration tests based on Westerlund (2007) and Pedroni (1999). Although less 
frequent in the literature than Pedroni’s, Westerlund tests do not rely on an assumption of 
                                                 
21
 Several countries can appear the leader level at least for one age group during a sub-period. The main primary 
education leaders are Austria, Japan, France and Switzerland. The main secondary education leaders are the United 
States, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. The main tertiary education leaders are the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand and Russia. 
22
 In 1980, Feldstein and Horioka published a famous regression evidencing close relationship between the investment 
rate and the savings rate at the country level, despite nascent financial globalisation. Since then, a number of scholars 
have re-run their regression and found looser relationships (see, e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). 
23
 We model the relationship between gross savings and gross capital formation (GCF). When cumulating fixed 
capital, we then correct GCF for the median of the distribution of average inventory changes (0.87% of GDP). 
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independence. The tests reject the null of no cointegration (at the 1% level for OECD countries, and at 
the 5% level for the non-OECD group). The results of the Pedroni tests are more mixed, but still tend 
to favour cointegration (see Appendix B).  
The corresponding error-correction model is then estimated using the Engle and Granger two-step 
method (see e.g. Coiteux and Olivier, 2000, or Herwartz and Xu, 2009). First, the long-run 
relationship (Equation 2.3) is estimated in panel, leading to estimates of    and  . This allows us to 
estimate the following relation with yearly data: 
                                                          (2.4) 
where   is the first-difference operator,     and    are estimates from equation (2.3), and    is the 
speed of adjustment towards the long-run relationship. 
Some authors estimate this relationship on a country-by-country basis (see Pelgrin and Schich, 2004 
for a review). However, the coefficients obtained can be insignificant, especially among developing 
countries (Mamingi, 1997). Using panel data estimation techniques increases the degrees of freedom 
for the estimation.  
Table 2 reports the cointegration vector for each panel of countries (OECD, and non-OECD). The  
coefficient obtained for the OECD panel (0.685) is in line with the literature. However, that obtained 
for the developing countries it is significantly lower, and lower than the coefficients estimated by 
Chakrabarti (2006): despite lower de jure capital mobility, emerging and developing countries seem to 
display higher de facto capital mobility than advanced ones, which can be related to relatively large 
current-account imbalances.24 
                                                 
24
 Over 1980-2008, the absolute value of current accounts for the non-OECD countries was 9.7% of GDP on average, 
compared to only 4% for the OECD countries. Calculation based on the IMF, World Economic Outlook database, 
April 2010. In addition, our developing countries sample is larger than the sample in Chakrabarti (2006) and our 
results for the non-OECD group might hide some heterogeneity. In the following, we keep different  coefficients for 
OECD and non-OECD countries. In results not reported here, we checked that the sensitivity of our results to this 
assumption was limited. See also Section 4.4. 
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Table 2 - The Feldstein-Horioka relation, cointegration vector 
 (1) (2) 
 OECD Non-OECD 
Savings rate 0.685*** 0.205*** 
 (0.018) (0.010) 
   
Constant 0.075*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0045) (0.002) 
R-sq 0.547 0.0819 
N 1232 5028 
Groups 30 139 
F-stat 36.96 24.78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: yearly data. Source: own calculations. 
The results of the error-correction models (ECM) are presented in Table 3. The Fisher test cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that all fixed effects are equal to zero. Hence, the ECMs are finally estimated 
with neither fixed effects nor a constant. The error correction coefficient    is found to be significant 
and negative for both groups of countries, with similar magnitude: each year, 20-25% of the 
discrepancy between the lagged investment rate and its (lagged) long-run value is erased. However, 
the impact of the short-term dynamics of the savings rate on the investment rate is higher for the 
OECD than in non-OECD group of countries. 
Table 3 - Error correction model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OECD OECD Non-OECD Non-OECD 
Delta Savings rate 0.769*** 0.767*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Error correction term -0.210*** -0.212*** -0.243*** -0.245*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
Constant -0.0006  0.0007  
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
R-sq 0.564 0.563 0.172 0.172 
N 1202 1202 4876 4876 
Groups 30  139  
F-stat 0.197  0.194  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Yearly data. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Finally, we are left with the nth country problem: with n countries in the world, there are only n-1 
independent savings-investment imbalances. In other words, savings-investment imbalances should 
sum to zero across our 147 countries (assuming that the weight is negligible for the remaining world 
countries). Rather than dropping the savings and investment equations for one country that might be 
considered as the ‘rest of the world’, we choose to distribute the discrepancy across all 147 countries, 
proportional to their share in world investments. Capital stocks are ultimately recovered through a 
permanent-inventory process with a 6 percent depreciation rate. 
2.4 Valuation effects 
As shown in Section 1, the evolution of real exchange rates for each country compared to the United 
States can be expressed as a simple function of capital-labor and energy productivity catch up, with 
proportionality factors that depend on the share of tradable goods in both GDP and consumption, and 
on the distribution of income across production factors in each country and in the United States. The 
share of energy in income is derived from the projection itself. As for the shares of tradables, we 
proceed step by step. We first calculate, for each sector, the export-to-production ratio.
25
 We then 
consider as tradable any sector displaying an export share exceeding 8%, which corresponds to the gap 
in the observed bimodal distribution of export shares.26 Having identified traded and non-traded 
sectors, we then calculate the share of the former in each country’s production and consumption. 
Finally, in order to account for changes in the shares of tradables in the economy along the catch-up 
process, we estimate two cross-section, logistic relationships between the share of tradables in 
consumption (resp. production) in country i, i, and GDP per capita in purchasing power parity,        :  
                                                 
25
 We use the sectoral classification of the Global Trade Analysis Project (Purdue University), which comprises 57 
sectors. 
26
 This threshold classifies services and a few agricultural sectors (cattle, paddy rice, raw milk and sugar cane) as non-
traded. 
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                              (2.5) 
We exclude from the sample those countries that appear as outliers, such as oil-producing countries 
and financial centres (which both have high shares of tradable goods and very high GDP per capita).27 
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 4. A rise in GDP per capita tends to reduce the 
share of tradables both in consumption and in production, and slightly more for the former than for the 
latter.
28 
 
Table 4 – Share of traded goods, estimation results 
 (1) (2) 
 Consumption Production 
Log of GDP per capita -0.172*** -0.101*** 
 (0.036) (0.022) 
   
Constant 0.998*** 0.813*** 
 (0.308) (0.190) 
Obs 165 165 
R-sq 0.126 0.113 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: own calculations. 
We can then project bilateral real exchange rates against the United States based on Equation (1.7), 
where the real exchange rate appreciates depending on relative TFP and energy productivity growth 
compared to the United States, and on the share of non-tradables in the economy.
29
 
3.  PROJECTED LONG-TERM GROWTH 
Using MaGE allows us to make long-run economic projections for 147 countries. Being a supply-side 
model, MaGE is unable to project any change in the output gap. Thus, the starting point for the 
projections should be a year when GDP was at its potential level in most countries. We then have to 
                                                 
27
 Namely, we drop Qatar, Luxemburg, United Arab Emirates, Kuweit, Singapore, Bahrein, Norway and Iceland. 
28
 We smooth out the shares of tradables in consumption and production in order to avoid a jump at the beginning of 
the projection. 
29
 The share of energy in income (GDP) is derived from the simulation itself. In oil-exporting countries, the real 
exchange-rate appreciation along economic catch-up may result from a Dutch disease rather than TFP growth in the 
tradable, non-oil sector. We are not able to distinguish the two effects in our model. 
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deal with the 2008-2009 global crisis. Starting our projection in 2007 would encounter the risk of 
overestimating GDPs because it would neglect the collapse in investment during the crisis. 
Additionally, the output gap may retrospectively appear largely positive the year before the crisis hit. 
We prefer to use IMF forecasts (Autumn, 2011) to project GDP up to 2012, and adjust TFP at this date 
so as to match with our projections of production factors at this horizon. We thus use MaGE to 
perform GDP projections for 2013 to 2050. This methodology may overstate the drop in TFP during 
the crisis since we are unable to account for the temporary fall in investment rates and the rise in 
unemployment, whose effects will extend beyond 2012. However, this feature is benign since our 
interest is in GDP, not employment or TFP and we focus on the long term.30  
From 2013 to 2050, we use UN projections of population by age group, ILO male activity rate (up to 
2020) and the EIA projection of the oil price (which we extrapolate from 2036 to 2050) as the only 
exogenous variables of our simulation. All other variables are projected endogenously by MaGE. 
2.2. Reference period 
Our projections rely on the econometric estimations presented in Section 3. One difficulty however is 
that, when included in the estimations, fixed effects are not always significant. Hence, it may be 
unwise to rely on fragile fixed effects that may considerably affect the results, especially over a long 
horizon. To circumvent this problem, our projections are based on differences from a (shorter) 
reference period, which will more likely resemble the starting point of our projection in terms of 
institutions. 
Let      denote a projected variable for country   in year t,       (    to ) its explanatory variables,    the corresponding coefficients. Denoting by      the country fixed effects, we have: 
                                                 
30
 Duval and de la Maisonneuve (2010) uses a similar strategy to deal with the crisis period. 
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                            (3.1) 
where      are the residuals of the estimation. Denoting by     the average value of      over a reference 
period, and by      the average value of       over the same period, we have:                                            (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) no longer relies on our estimates of country- (or region-)specific constants; it rather 
explains the deviations of   from its average during the reference period. Here we choose 1995-2008 
as the reference period. This period corresponds to the post-transition era. It follows important 
structural reforms in China and corresponds to the emergence of a number of large, developing 
economies.
31
 The error term is dropped in the projection exercise.  
When the estimation is run on 5-year intervals (education, female participation, TFP, energy 
productivity), projections are turned into yearly data by considering constant growth rates over each 5-
year window.
 32
  When estimations are conducted on 5-year averages (savings rate), we build yearly 
data by applying the estimated relation to each year, successively.  
2.3. Key inputs 
We can now illustrate the role of our four main innovations relative to the literature: energy, female 
participation, imperfect capital mobility and valuation effects.
33
 
                                                 
31
 Alternatively, we could have chosen the entire 1980-2008 period as the reference. This would have been equivalent 
to working with fixed effects. The non-significance of some fixed effects can then be easily understood given the 
heterogeneity of this long period for a large number of countries. We could also have tried to make the fixed effects 
endogenous, e.g. if institutions are supposed to converge over time. However it is difficult to set a priori which 
institution is going to dominate the world by 2050, therefore we do not include convergence of institutions in our 
central scenario, but develop a sensitivity analysis in section 4.4. 
32
 TFP growth for leaders is set to 0.995 percent per year (the leader group’s average over 1995-2008). We allow for a 
smooth transition between catching-up and leader status, starting when the country reaches 90 percent of the frontier 
level. Financial centres such as Luxembourg, Switzerland or Iceland are excluded from the leaders group. Their TFP is 
then simply assumed to grow at the same pace as that of the frontier. 
33
 The projection of each production factor for all the 147 countries up to 2050 is available at www.cepii.fr.  
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Our projections of energy productivity are reported in Figure 1 for selected countries and areas.  The 
energy productivity of frontier countries (the UK, Japan, Germany and France) is assumed to increase 
at a constant exogenous rate (+0.25 percent per year, which corresponds to their average growth rate 
over 1995-2008). The remaining countries tend to catch up to this frontier, except in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where industrialization tends to hinder the catch-up process.
34
 
Figure 1 – Energy productivity, 1980-2050, OECD and BRICs (2005 USD per barrel) 
 Notations: CHN=People’s Republic of China; IND=India; RUS=Russia; JPN=Japan; 
BRA=Brazil; EU27=European Union 27; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: own calculations. 
The projection of female participation rates results from two opposite effects. On the one hand, higher 
education tends to raise female participation rates; on the other hand, longer studies means less 
participation of younger women. For advanced economies, the latter effect dominates since 
participation rates are already high at the beginning of the simulation. This is also the case for China, 
Brazil and Russia (Figure 2). For some emerging countries, however, there is a significant increase in 
                                                 
34
 However no country of the sample experiences a fall in energy productivity in our projections, meaning that they all 
lie beyond the U-curve turning point at the beginning of the projection. Note that our catch-up process implies that  
energy productivity observed over the past in advanced economies cannot continue, hence the income elasticity of 
energy consumption is expected to increase for these countries, while declining in emerging and developing countries, 
in contrast to past features (see IMF, 2011). 
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female participation over the projection period. This is especially the case for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
India and Turkey, where participation rates increase by 5 to 10 percentage points from 2010 to 2050.35 
Figure 2 – Female participation rates, 1980-2050, selected countries (percent) 
 Notations: CHN=People’s Republic of China; IND=India; RUS=Russia; BRA=Brazil; 
TUR=Turkey; IDN=Indonesia; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa; MENA=Middle-East and 
North Africa (excl. Turkey).  
Source: own calculations. 
As reported in Figure 3, our modelling of (imperfect) capital mobility leads to a reversal in the saving-
investment balance in China (that switches to a deficit around 2030), India (that quickly switches to a 
surplus) and Sub-Saharan Africa (switch to a surplus after 2040).36 In contrast, Russia keeps a large 
surplus along the projection period, whereas Brazil continues running a deficit. These imbalances 
mean that investment rates can differ by several percentage points from saving rates all along the 
period, although the sign of the gap changes over time in some countries. 
                                                 
35
 In the case of Turkey, there is an initial catch-up to the average behavior of the MENA region in terms of education.  
36
 The United States moves close to balance at the 2050 horizon. 
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Figure 3 – Savings-Investment balance  
(percent of GDP), 1980-2050 
 
Note: savings minus gross fixed capital formation, see Figure 1 for notations. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Lastly, the role of valuation effects must be emphasized. In the Balassa-Samuelson framework 
described above, TFP and energy productivity catch-up involve a real exchange-rate appreciation 
against the US dollar, at a speed that depends on the share of non-tradable goods in each economy. As 
might be expected, India, China and Russia especially enjoy strong real exchange-rate appreciation up 
to 2050 (Figure 4). Japan also sees its real exchange rate appreciate steadily because its GDP growth 
heavily relies on TFP growth, in the context of a declining workforce. 
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Figure 4 – Bilateral real exchange rate against the United States, 1980-2050*  
 
* A rise refers to a real appreciation against the United States. 
Notations: see Figure 1; FRA=France; DEU=Germany; NGA=Nigeria. 
Source: own calculations. 
2.4. GDP 
To project the volume of GDP for our sample of 147 countries from 2013 to 2050, we combine labour, 
capital, TFP and energy productivity. Figure 5 depicts GDP growth rates in volumes. Up to 2025, the 
highest growth rate is achieved by China, but from 2025 to 2050 it is overtaken by India and Sub-
Saharan Africa on average, the latter outperforming the former around year 2040. After 2030 Japan 
experiences very low growth rates. This reflects its reduced labour force which is not fully 
compensated for by capital accumulation and TFP growth, as well as its attaining the TFP frontier and 
therefore not benefiting anymore from catching-up. 
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Figure 5 –5-year average GDP growth rate, 1980-2050 (volume)  
 
Notations: see Figure 1. Source: own calculations. 
Measured in 2005 US dollars, China’s GDP could overtake the US one around 2040, and could be 
25% larger than the US in 2050 (Figure 6a). This would make China the largest economy in the world 
in 2050 (with 21% of global GDP), followed by the EU27 (if considered as a bloc), the United States 
and India, the latter overtaking Japan around 2040. 
To estimate standards of living, we convert projected GDP into purchasing power parity (PPP) of 2005 
and divide this by projected population. Our calculations suggest that China’s GDP per capita could 
reach 92% of the US level in 2050, despite still low TFP (46% of US level in 2050).  Figure 6b further 
shows that GDP per capita in India and Brazil would reach 33% and 44% of the US level in 2050, 
respectively. Japan would catch up completely with the US at the 2050 horizon, while the EU would 
remain 18% below the US level. As for Russia, the combination of a rising oil rent with a declining 
working force would lead to a steady rise in GDP per capita. 
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Figure 6 – Different measures of GDP 
6a. GDP in 2005 USD 
 
6b. GDP per capita (PPP, % of 
US) 
6c. GDP with relative price 
variations 
   
Notations: see Figure 1. 
Source: own calculations. 
Finally, Figure 6c depicts the evolution of GDPs measured at variable relative prices (this includes 
both nominal exchange rate and inflation appreciation, without disentangling the two effects). Adding 
these valuation effects naturally strengthens the shift of the global economy towards China and India, 
with the latter approaching the size of the US economy at the 2050 horizon (8-9% of global GDP). 
The size of the EU27 now appears significantly larger than that of the US at the same horizon.
37
  
4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyse the role of our modelling of energy, female participation and imperfect 
capital mobility in our projections. 38 We also study a scenario of institutional convergence. 
4.1 Energy 
Table 5 shows the impact of a higher energy price on GDP in selected countries or areas. Specifically, 
we retain the higher range of EIA oil price projections (i.e. 65% more expensive in 2030, which we 
                                                 
37
 Our projections for Brazil might appear conservative. This is because they are based on econometric relationships 
estimated for 1980-2009, a period when its average economic performance was relatively poor. 
38
 The impact of valuation effects is already clear by comparing GDP projections with and without relative price 
variations. 
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extrapolate to reach an increase by 36% in 2050 compared to the baseline price
39). In a standard GDP 
projection without energy, switching to a high oil-price scenario would have no impact on GDP. Here, 
we find that world GDP in volume is reduced by 1.4 percent in 2050 when the oil price is higher by 36 
percent. The impact is rather limited in advanced economies where energy productivity is very high at 
that horizon.
40
 The effect is more marked for less energy-efficient countries. In oil-producing 
countries, the negative impact of a higher oil price on non-oil GDP is mitigated by higher oil rents. 
Table 5 – Impact of energy price in 2050, selected countries 
 
Energy intensity in 2050  GDP volume in 2050 
  Baseline 
High energy 
price 
 Non-oil GDP 
(in %) 
GDP including 
oil rents (in %) 
USA 0.9 0.8   -0.8 -0.7 
Japan 0.6 0.6   -0.5 -0.5 
EU27 0.7 0.7   -0.8 -0.7 
Brazil 1.2 1.1   -2.3 -1.6 
Russia 2.5 2.4   -7.0 -4.3 
India 2.0 2.0   -3.4 -3.9 
China 1.9 1.8   -3.4 -3.3 
Turkey 0.9 0.9   -1.8 -1.8 
MENA 1.6 1.4   -6.8 -1.0 
SSA 2.8 2.6   -14.2 -13.0 
World 1.4 1.3   -2.9 -2.4 
Note: MENA=Middle-East and North-Africa; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. Percentage changes 
compared to the baseline presented in Section 3. Interpretation: world GDP in volume is 
reduced by 2.4 percent in 2050 when the oil price is 36% higher than in the baseline (last 
column, last row). 
Source: own calculations. 
4.2 Female participation 
We now measure the impact of our modeling of female participation rates at the 2050 horizon by 
comparing it with a more standard one where female participation rates are modeled like for males, i.e. 
their variations are largely bounded. The results are reported in Table 6. Our modeling leads to 
                                                 
39
 The corresponding real prices in constant 2005 USD are respectively 185 USD in 2030, compared to 112 USD in 
the baseline; and 207 USD in 2050 compared to 152 USD in our reference case. We are unable to project extreme oil-
price scenarios where the relative price of energy would exceed energy productivity (in that case GDP would be 
undefined, see Equation (1.2) in Section 1.1). 
40
 This benign result for advanced economies is in line with IMF (2011). 
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generally higher participation rates, with an impact on the labor force at the 2050 horizon that reaches 
+15.1% in Turkey, +7.9% in Japan, +7% in India and +5.4% in the MENA region. Conversely, the net 
impact of education catch-up of our modeling of the labor force is slightly negative for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. On the whole, there is a positive (although limited) impact on global GDP (+1.6%).  
Table 6 – Impact of female participation rates in 2050, selected countries 
 
Female participation rates (%)  Labor force  GDP in volume 
  Baseline "ILO"* 
 Variation in 2050  
Baseline/ILO (%) 
 Variation in 2050 
Baseline/ILO (%) 
USA 55.1 54.0   +0.9   +0.6 
Japan 51.8 43.4   +7.9   +8.3 
EU27 43.0 44.6   -1.7   -1.1 
Brazil 50.6 57.2   -5.5   -4.1 
Russia 49.4 50.9   -1.5   -1.0 
India 37.8 29.6   +7.0   +6.7 
China 51.7 50.1   +1.4   +1.6 
Turkey 30.8 17.9   +15.1   +14.2 
MENA 30.0 24.8   +5.4   +3.5 
SSA 64.5 65.9   -1.0   -0.4 
World 48.5 46.5   +1.6   +1.6 
* Same methodology for females as for males. 
Note: MENA=Middle-East and North-Africa (excl. Turkey); SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Interpretation: world GDP in volume is increased by 1.6 percent in 2050 when the impact of 
education on female participation is accounted for (last column, last row). 
Source: own calculations. 
4.3 Imperfect capital mobility 
Our next exercise is to compare our projections including imperfect capital mobility with a closed-
economy projection where investment always equals savings on a country-by-country basis. The 
results are depicted in Table 7. By construction, countries that are in current-account surplus over 
2010-2050 get a lower investment rate in the baseline, hence lower capital accumulation in an open 
economy versus a closed economy. GDP is then lower too.
41
 This is the case of Russia, the MENA 
region and, to a lesser extent, of India or Japan. China moves from this category to the deficit one 
around 2030. On the whole, it gets a slightly higher investment rate on average, hence a higher GDP in 
                                                 
41
 Unlike GDP, GNP may turn higher in an open economy for these countries. 
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2050 under the open-economy scenario, compared to the closed one. The United States and Brazil also 
benefit from capital openness. On the whole, the last line of Table 7 shows that (imperfect) capital 
mobility leads to a higher world GDP by 0.02% at the 2050 horizon, which is consistent with the 
standard neoclassical result of a better allocation of capital worldwide, though with a limited 
magnitude. Note that our model by construction depicts a peaceful financial globalization with no 
financial crises. 
Table 7 – Impact of imperfect capital mobility in 2050, selected countries 
 
Investment rate 
(2010-50 average, in %) 
 
GDP in volume 
  Baseline 
Closed 
economy 
 variation in 2050 
(Baseline/closed %) 
USA 14.8 13.6   +3.0 
Japan 20.7 21.0   -1.2 
EU27 16.8 17.0   +0.3 
Brazil 17.1 14.0   +7.9 
Russia 20.7 27.8   -12.3 
India 20.1 22.3   -4.8 
China 30.9 29.9   +1.9 
MENA 20.6 24.9   -1.1 
SSA 16.1 16.9   -0.1 
World 20.1 20.5   +0.02 
Note: MENA=Middle-East and North-Africa; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Interpretation: world GDP in volume is increased by 0.02 percent in 2050 when 
international capital mobility is introduced (last column, last row). 
Source: own calculations. 
4.4. Institutional convergence 
Our projection exercise relies on econometric estimations which in most cases include 
country (our country group) fixed effects. These fixed effects are supposed to capture 
unobserved and time invariant country characteristics. However, over such a long period, one 
cannot exclude changes in these factors which encompass different aspects of institutions. In 
this last sensitivity exercise, we measure how a convergence of some institutional features 
could affect our projections. Since our projections are based on a reference period (rather than 
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fixed effects), our scenario relies on a convergence of variables average (measured over the 
reference period). Regarding education, energy productivity and the Feldstein-Horioka 
relationship, institutions are also embodies in slope estimates differences between the 
different country groups. The targets towards which institutions (as captured by reference 
averages and estimated slopes) are supposed to converge linearly are listed in Table 8. It must 
be noted that the selection of one or several reference country(ies) for convergence is highly 
debatable for at least two reasons: (i) it is not always easy to see which countries have the 
“good” institutions, and (ii) there is no reason for all behaviors converging at the same pace. 
The simulation is however instructive as a sensitivity exercise.  
Table 8: reference country(ies) for institutional convergence 
Variable  Reference country(ies) 
Savings rate  Average OECD 
Education  Highest coefficient (Easter Europe, Western Europe 
or North America, depending on the age group and 
education level) 
Female 
participation 
 Average OECD 
TFP growth  Average of highest significant fixed effects: EU27, 
Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Macao, 
Singapore, China, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Slovenia and Switzerland. 
Energy 
productivity 
 Average of significantly positive fixed effects: 
Austria, Ireland, Italy and Norway. 
Feldstein-
Horioka 
 Average OECD 
 
The results are reported in Table 9. This convergence scenario clearly raises the overall level 
of education and productivity (both energy productivity and TFP). In contrast, the impact of 
institutional convergence on female participation and capital accumulation varies across 
countries, with a strong, positive effect in India and MENA countries, whereas female 
participation falls in China and Sub-Saharan Africa. As for capital accumulation, it is reduced 
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at the global level due to reduced saving rates in emerging countries. The net effect of all 
these changes is an increase by 0.3 percentage point of global GDP growth on average over 
the 2012-50 period, benefiting mostly emerging countries, especially India which cumulates 
additional investment in education, increased female participation and faster productivity 
growth. Growth rates are slightly reduced in advanced economies.  
Table 9: impact of institutional convergence (pp change in 2050 or over 2012-50) 
  
2050         2012-2050             
  
Seconary 
education 
Tertiary 
education   
Female 
part.   TFP 
Energy 
prod.   
Savings 
rate 
Investment 
rate   GDP 
  
pp of labor force   pp. of pop.   pp. growth   pp. of GDP   pp. growth 
USA +0.0 +0.5   -0.1   +0.0 +0.9   +0.1 -1.3   -0.1 
Japan +0.0 +0.4   -0.0   +0.0 +0.0   +0.3 -1.6   -0.1 
EU27 +0.6 +1.7   -0.1   +0.0 +0.2   +0.1 -1.4   -0.1 
Brazil +2.7 +7.4   -5.5   +0.7 +1.4   -0.1 -1.7   +0.7 
Russia +0.1 +0.7   +0.9   +0.5 +3.3   -7.1 -3.2   +0.7 
India +3.9 +11.8   +12.4   +0.7 +2.4   -3.2 -2.8   +1.1 
China +0.6 +8.6   -10.1   +0.1 +2.3   -10.0 -4.6   -0.2 
MENA +2.6 +6.9   +20.3   +0.4 +2.4   -2.9 -2.4   +1.2 
SSA +16.4 +15.2   -13.3   +0.5 +3.2   -0.9 -2.0   +1.0 
World +5.5 +9.8   -0.4   0.0 +1.0   -2.4 -2.4   +0.3 
Source: own calculations. MENA: Middle-East and North Africa; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
CONCLUSION 
A theoretically consistent model of world economic growth is especially important for projecting GDP 
in several countries over a long time period. To this purpose we have developed MaGE 
(Macroeconometrics of the Global Economy), a theoretically founded framework to project long-term 
growth in a consistent way for the world economy. The model improves on the literature by 
incorporating in a consistent way endogenous energy productivity, female participation rates and 
valuation effects, and in assuming imperfect international capital mobility. We rely on a nested CES 
production function and on original econometric estimations to produce a set of macroeconomic 
projections for 147 countries at the 2050 horizon. These distinctive features significantly affect GDP 
levels for specific countries, without significant impact on the global economy. 
30 
 
Although our results, as any study of this type, should be treated with caution, we believe that they 
provide useful benchmarks for downstream studies on world commodity demand, international trade, 
financing capacities, global power, etc. They also provide a fully-transparent, theoretically-grounded 
and flexible tool for the research community. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES 
Variable Detail Period Sources 
GDP Constant USD of 2005 1980-2012 World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, van Ark et al. 
(1998), Cepii-Chelem. 
Oil rent % of GDP 1980-2009 World Bank 
Population Million, five-year age groups 1980-2050 United Nations, median fertility 
scenario 
Participation 
rate 
% per age group and gender 1980-2020, 
5-year step 
International labour 
organization 
Education Share of age group with a 
primary, secondary or tertiary 
diploma 
1980-2010, 
5-year step 
Barro and Lee (2010, revision 
1.2) 
Energy 
consumption 
Primary energy use before 
transformation 
1980-2008 World Bank 
Oil price Constant USD of 2008, which are 
then converted into constant USD 
of 2005 by dividing by 1.102 
1980-2035 US Energy Information Agency, 
medium projection 
Energy 
productivity 
Derived from optimal behaviour 
(Equation 1.2) 
1980-2008 Own calculations 
Total factor 
productivity 
Derived from production function 
(equation 1.3) 
1980-2008 Own calculations 
Saving rate Private and public 1980-2008 World Bank 
Investment rate  Gross and gross fixed capital 
formation, private and public 
1980-2008 World Bank 
Capital stock Permanent inventory with 6% 
depreciation 
1960-2009 Penn World Tables (1960) and 
own calculations (1961 - 2009 
or 1960 - 2009, depending on 
data availability) 
Real exchange 
rate 
Nominal exchange rate against 
USD divided by PPP conversion 
factor 
1980-2009 World Bank and own 
calculations
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Share of traded 
goods in 
production/ in 
consumption 
Calibrated for year 2004 based on 
the GTAP database (57 sectors, 
including services) 
2004 Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP)43 and own calculations. 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Based on the International Comparison Project (ICP), this dataset has received a number of criticisms, notably 
following the large downward revision of Chinese PPP GDP in 2008. In fact, key methodological choices such as the 
coverage of price surveys (either urban or also rural), the weighting schemes of price indices, or the calibration of 
productivity in services or the valuation of imports and exports, may heavily impact on the results (see Deaton and 
Heston, 2010, Feenstra et al., 2012). We nevertheless rely on this database which is readily available for a large 
number of countries over our estimation period. Given the uncertainty surrounding the data, our results in terms of 
evolutions may be more meaningful than those in terms of absolute values. 
43
 See www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu 
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APPENDIX B: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATIONS 
a. Female participation rates 
Table B. 1 – Female participation rates estimation by age group, five-year intervals 
Dependent variable : 
logistic transformation 
of female participation 
by age group 
(1) 
15-19 
(2) 
20-24 
(3) 
25-29 
(4) 
30-34 
(5) 
35-39 
(6) 
40-44 
age-specific secondary 
education 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
       
age-specific tertiary 
education 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
       
Constant -0.460*** 
(0.051) 
0.116** 
(0.049) 
-0.228*** 
(0.052) 
-0.101** 
(0.051) 
0.050 
(0.041) 
0.132*** 
(0.035) 
N 980 980 980 980 980 980 
Groups 140 140 140 140 140 140 
R-sq. 0.122 0.054 0.249 0.248 0.253 0.276 
F-stat 58.076 23.778 139.284 138.351 141.560 159.486 
p-value 47.261 62.794 54.546 61.834 74.157 88.382 
      
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 
age-specific secondary 
education 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
      
age-specific tertiary 
education 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
      
Constant 0.108*** 
(0.030) 
-0.182*** 
(0.025) 
-0.725*** 
(0.022) 
-1.116*** 
(0.022) 
-2.042*** 
(0.026) 
N 980 980 980 980 980 
Groups 140 140 140 140 140 
R-sq. 0.265 0.303 0.396 0.126 0.041 
F-stat 150.75 181.72 274.95 60.45 17.74 
p-value 86.75 98.76 114.06 106.77 91.15 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: own calculations. 
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b. Education  
We rely on a catch-up model of school attainment for two successive age groups: 15-19, and 20-24 
years, and three education levels - primary, secondary and tertiary.
44
 The leader country is defined as 
the country displaying the highest share of educated people for each age group and each level of 
education. It may vary over time.
45
 We first estimate the following, catching-up process, on five-year-
interval data:                                                    (B.1) 
where          is the proportion of the age-group   in country   having a level of education of at least   
(         ) in year  ,        is the corresponding level of schooling in the leader country,            and            are the corresponding variables five year before, and       is the catch-up coefficient that is 
assumed to vary across regions  . We perform a weighted estimation of Equation (B.1) (using the 
population shares within each region as a weighing device, and clustering the residuals). 
The results are reported in Table B.2. There is evidence of a significant catch-up for all regions and all 
education levels. The speed varies across regions, with former USSR and Eastern Europe being the 
fastest and Indian region and Sub-Saharan Africa being the slowest. We can also note that tertiary 
catch-up speeds are lower than for primary and secondary education.  
For primary and secondary education, we will assume the leader level to remain fixed at 100% of both 
age groups, consistent with the attainment in 2010. As for tertiary education, we fit a logistic 
                                                 
44
 Barro and Lee (2010) follow the UNESCO “ISCED” classification that defines the first tertiary level diploma (level 
5) as “comprising education which begins at the age of 17 or 18, lasts about four year, and leads to an award not 
equivalent to a first university degree.” Hence we can safely assume that this first level of tertiary education (which is 
a minimum requirement for our tertiary-education category) is completed before 24 years old, so we can concentrate 
on the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups. 
45
 Several countries can appear the leader level at least for one age group during a sub-period. The main primary 
education leaders are Austria, Japan, France and Switzerland. The main secondary education leaders are the United 
States, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. The main tertiary education leaders are the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand and the Russian Federation. 
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functional form such that tertiary education for age-group 5 (20-24 years) increases over time without 
ever exceeding 100%:                              (B.2) 
All coefficients are significant at a 1% confidence level, with an R-squared of 0.917. As expected, 
tertiary education rises steadily over time in the leader country for the 20-24 age group, with           and         . 
 
For all countries, the proportion of primary, secondary and tertiary education attainment in each of our 
11 age groups (from 15-19 to 64-69) is then obtained based on the size and ageing process of the 15-
19 and 20-24 groups.
46
 The share of different levels of education in the working-age population is 
ultimately recovered based on the age structure of the population. 
                                                 
46
 For the leader country, tertiary education of the 15-19 age group is recovered from that of the 20-24 group, based on 
the observed correlation of 97 percent between the two: a one percent increase in tertiary education for the 20-24 group 
occurs together with a 0.41 percent increase in that of the 15-19 group. 
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Table B. 2 – Education catch-up process, by education level, age group and region 
Dependent 
variable: 
education growth 
by age group 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
(1) 
Age 4 
(2) 
Age 5 
(3) 
Age 4 
(4) 
Age 5 
(5) 
Age 4 
(6) 
Age 5 
Western Europe 0.130*** 
(0.039) 
0.273*** 
(0.083) 
0.220*** 
(0.056) 
0.200*** 
(0.013) 
0.402** 
(0.157) 
0.217*** 
(0.028) 
       
Eastern Europe 
and former USSR 
0.250*** 
(0.030) 
0.326*** 
(0.071) 
0.143*** 
(0.053) 
0.273*** 
(0.034) 
0.324*** 
(0.026) 
0.235*** 
(0.017) 
       
North America, 
Oceania and Japan 
0.205*** 
(0.064) 
0.173*** 
(0.025) 
0.456*** 
(0.075) 
0.275*** 
(0.015) 
0.188*** 
(0.062) 
0.289*** 
(0.030) 
       
Latin America 0.192*** 
(0.007) 
0.204*** 
(0.019) 
0.136*** 
(0.015) 
0.148*** 
(0.008) 
0.181*** 
(0.017) 
0.133*** 
(0.009) 
       
Mediterranean 
region 
0.178*** 
(0.014) 
0.177*** 
(0.009) 
0.188*** 
(0.016) 
0.156*** 
(0.009) 
0.211*** 
(0.034) 
0.132*** 
(0.009) 
       
Chinese region 0.148*** 
(0.019) 
0.265*** 
(0.029) 
0.140*** 
(0.012) 
0.196*** 
(0.017) 
0.191*** 
(0.019) 
0.0852*** 
(0.005) 
       
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
0.125*** 
(0.016) 
0.111*** 
(0.011) 
0.0763*** 
(0.008) 
0.0950*** 
(0.008) 
0.0430 
(0.026) 
0.0601*** 
(0.005) 
       
India region 0.120*** 
(0.007) 
0.114*** 
(0.010) 
0.154*** 
(0.030) 
0.136*** 
(0.005) 
0.102*** 
(0.005) 
0.0892*** 
(0.005) 
R-sq 0.529 0.488 0.323 0.485 0.273 0.186 
N 1669 1663 1626 1662 1054 1630 
Clusters 140 140 140 140 138 140 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Note : 5-year intervals 
Source : own calculations. 
c. TFP 
Following Vandenbussche et al. (2006), TFP growth is modeled as the combination of a pure catch-up 
effect, a pure education effect, and an interaction term between education and catch up. The latter 
effect refers to the impact of tertiary education on the ability of a country to move the technological 
frontier itself (see Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Here, we slightly depart from the two cited papers by 
introducing both secondary and tertiary education in the equation. As noted for instance by Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1994), secondary education is crucial when it comes to technology diffusion. Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) argue that secondary education tends to favor imitation-type catch up, whereas tertiary 
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education favors innovation. Hence, we interact the catching-up term with secondary rather than 
tertiary education, and keep tertiary education as a separate term.
47
 We estimate the following relation, 
again on five-year intervals due to the periodicity of education data:                                                                        (B.3) 
where       denotes the TFP of country i in year t,                         represents the distance to the 
TFP frontier    in year    ,48         is the proportion of the working-age population with a tertiary 
diploma,                 is the proportion of the working-age population with a secondary diploma but 
no tertiary one, and      is a regional fixed effect. We expect      (TFP growth is lower when 
country   is closer to the frontier),      (more tertiary education is beneficial to innovation), and      (more secondary education tends to reduce the negative effect of being closer to the TFP 
frontier). To circumvent endogeneity problems, we use lagged values of       ,        ,                        ,              ,                (i.e. twice-lagged variables) as our five instrumental variables, in 
line with the literature.
49
 Finally, we follow Vandenbussche in using region-specific effects that are 
based jointly on geographical and income criteria. We therefore use our geographical zones in 
conjunction with the World Bank classification of income levels (High- (H), Medium- (M) and Low- 
                                                 
47
 Introducing the interaction between secondary education and distance to TFP leader in the formulation by 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) would mathematically imply the addition of a "secondary and more" term, but 
preliminary tests showed that this term was not significant.  
48
 The TFP frontier is made of the five highest TFP countries. The composition of this group varies over time within 
the following list: the USA, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and 
Iceland (we excluded Luxembourg and Switzerland as outliers). In the projection exercise, each country reaching the 
group of the five best performers at least once is applied the average, 0.995% TFP growth rate of the TFP frontier of 
the 1995-2008 period. Hence, the technological frontier includes more and more countries over time. 
49
 See Vandenbussche et al. (2006). In order to select our specification, we follow the methodology and tests proposed 
by Baum, C.; Schaffer, M. & S. Stillman, (2003), 'Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing', Stata 
Journal 3(1), 1-31. We first run the Durbin-Wu-Hausman joint-endogeneity test, which rejects, at the 5 percent 
confidence level, the null of joint exogeneity of secondary education, tertiary education and distance to frontier. 
Regarding instrumentation, our goodness-of-fit tests suggest that these instruments are relevant (they are correlated 
with the instrumented variables), and the different validity tests performed all fail to reject the null of orthogonality at 
the 5% confidence level, hence  confirming the orthogonality of the instruments with the error terms. The results from 
these different tests are available from the authors. 
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(L) income). We then need to cluster the residuals by country. The results are reported in Table B.3. 
All coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level, with expected signs. Ceteris paribus, being 10 
percent below the TFP frontier induces a 0.1 percent extra growth of TFP, for a median level of 
secondary education. In turn, a rise of tertiary education by 10 percentage points raises TFP growth by 
0.5 percentage points. 
Table B. 3 – TFP estimation results 
Dependent variable: TFP growth (1) 
Distance to the TFP frontier 
-0.0154*** 
(0.005) 
Tertiary education 0.0537*** 
(0.019) 
Distance to frontier×secondary 
education 
-0.0137*** 
(0.005) 
Hansen J-stat 
(p-value) 
3.565 
(0.168) 
No. Obs. 650 
No. clusters 132 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Note: 5-year intervals 
Source: own calculations. 
d. Savings rate 
Following Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei’s (1998), we specify the saving rate as a function of the age-
structure of the population and on the GDP-per-capita gap with the leading economy. To summarize 
the age structure with a few variables, we use the methodology proposed by Higgins (1998): denoting 
by j (j=      ) each cohort of the population (0-4, 5-9, ..., 65-69 and 70+) and    its proportion in the 
population, we define each demographic variable dk (k=1,...,K) as follows:                            (B.4) 
The number of demographic variables (K) is determined by an Akaike information criterion. It is set to 
three here. The estimated equation then: 
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                                                                                             (B.5) 
where          denotes the saving rate in country i at time t (5-year average),      is country  ’s per 
capita GDP,      is the rate of growth of per capita GDP,50 and the variables       are demographic 
factors constructed as follows (for simplicity, country and year subscripts are dropped):  
The behaviour underpinning Equation (B.5) is structural. However it may omit important determinants 
of savings rates, such as institutions, governance or culture, which move only slowly, hence cannot be 
introduced in a panel regression. Covering these factors would require a pluridisciplinary approach 
that is beyond the scope of this paper. We then assume constant institutions that are embodied in the 
country fixed effects.  
The econometric results are presented in Table B. 4. An increase in per capita GDP relative to the US, 
or a higher per capita GDP growth rate, implies a rise in the savings rate. In terms of the demographic 
factors, only their interaction with growth has a significant impact on the savings rate. Hence our 
preferred specification is the one in Column (2) of Table B.4, where additive demographic factors are 
dropped, as well as the non-linear term in GDP per capita. 
                                                 
50
 Both per capita GDP and its growth rate are lagged so that the equation can be used non-recursively in a projection 
exercise. 
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Table B. 4 – Determinants of the savings rate, estimation results 
Dependent variable: saving rate (1) (2) 
Lagged GDP per cap. rel. to the USA 0.205*** 0.121*** 
(0.055) (0.019) 
   
Lagged squared GDP per cap. rel. to the 
USA 
-0.013  
(0.011)  
   
Lagged GDP per cap. growth 1.007*** 1.139*** 
(0.284) (0.237) 
   
Demography d1 0.218  
(0.196)  
   
Demography d2 -0.015  
(0.033)  
   
Demography d3 -0.000  
(0.002)  
   
d1 x GDP per cap. growth -13.068*** -12.074*** 
(3.739) (3.203) 
   
d2 x GDP per cap. growth 2.253*** 2.149*** 
(0.611) (0.521) 
   
d3 x GDP per cap. growth -0.102*** -0.099*** 
(0.027) (0.023) 
   
Constant 0.035 0.140*** 
(0.029) (0.006) 
N 929 929 
R-sq. 0.172 0.152 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note : 5-year averages 
Source: own calculations.  
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e. Savings and investment (panel cointegration tests) 
Tables B.5 and B.6 report various panel cointegration tests for the OECD and non-OECD samples. 
Pedroni’s tests use a null hypothesis of no cointegration, both for homogenous or heterogeneous 
panels. Among these tests, four have an alternative hypothesis of a homogenous cointegration relation 
(“within”, which are panel- , panel- , panel-PP and panel-ADF) and the three other have an 
alternative hypothesis of heterogenous cointegration (“between”, which are group- , group-PP and 
group-ADF). Westerlund tests are second-generation tests, with a null hypothesis of no cointegration 
for all countries. Ga and Gt statistics operate in panel context, with an alternative hypothesis of 
cointegration for at least one country. On the contrary, Pa and Pt operate on pooled data, and the 
alternative hypothesis of the test is that there is cointegration for all individuals. The difference 
between the “a” and “t” tests is that they respectively use weighted average of the ECM coefficients 
and t-ratios respectively. 
The conclusion of these tests is straightforward: we are in front of two cointegrated variables for 
which we may assume homogenous cointegration relation (within each group). Note that these tests do 
not infer anything about the possibility of fixed effects in the estimated cointegration relations. 
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Table B. 5 – Cointegration tests for the OECD group 
Author Name H0 Ha Statistic p-value 5% test 
       
Pedroni 
(13 countries) 
Panel-  No coint. All homogenous coint. -0.937 0.826  
panel-  No coint. All homogenous coint. -2.247 0.012  
panel-PP No coint. All homogenous coint. -4.201 0.000  
Panel-ADF No coint. All homogenous coint. -5.239 0.000  
group-  No coint. All heterogenous coint. 0.049 0.519  
group-PP No coint. All heterogenous coint. -2.388 0.008  
group-ADF No coint. All heterogenous coint. -4.932 0.000  
       
Westerlund Ga No coint. At least 1 coint. -7.600 0.000  
Gt No coint. At least 1 coint. -1.847 0.000  
Pa No coint. All heterogenous coint. -9.048 0.000  
Pt No coint. All heterogenous coint. -4.862 0.000  
       
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table B. 6 – Cointegration tests for the non-OECD group 
Author Name H0 Ha Statistic p-value 5% test 
       
Pedroni 
(37 countries) 
Panel-  No coint. All homogenous coint. -1.323 0.9072  
panel-  No coint. All homogenous coint. -4.561 0.0000  
panel-PP No coint. All homogenous coint. -5.551 0.0000  
Panel-ADF No coint. All homogenous coint. -7.376 0.0000  
group-  No coint. All heterogenous coint. -1.612 0.0534  
group-PP No coint. All heterogenous coint. -6.310 0.0000  
group-ADF No coint. All heterogenous coint. -8.304 0.0000  
       
Westerlund Ga No coint. At least 1 coint. -4.660 0.019  
Gt No coint. At least 1 coint. -1.186 0.013  
Pa No coint. All heterogenous coint. -4.358 0.000  
Pt No coint. All heterogenous coint. -5.070 0.000  
       
Source: own calculations 
 
 
